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Justice Stephen Breyer argues that we live in an “ever more interdependent 
world,”
1
 one in which commercial transactions, environmental problems, and 
security challenges cross borders to a greater extent than at any time in the 
past. These interactions have produced a wave of legal disputes that require the 
attention of the Supreme Court. He argues that Supreme Court Justices should 
inform themselves about foreign countries and foreign legal systems so that 
they can decide these foreign relations cases correctly, and that they should not 
be afraid to learn from foreign legal systems. Additionally, U.S. Justices should 
help judges in other countries advance the rule of law in their countries by 
meeting with them and informing them how the American legal system oper-
ates. 
Breyer makes this argument by marching through cases that are drawn 
from what scholars usually call “foreign relations law,”
2
 cases involving national 
security, statutes with extraterritorial effect, treaties, and constitutional inter-
pretation using foreign and international sources. The book can be read at two 
levels. At one level, it simply describes the recent cases and shows that the 
Court must deal, one way or another, with foreign and international texts and 
events that occur overseas. But Breyer has bigger fish to fry. He attempts to 
show that the Court should try to advance liberal legal norms abroad and at 
home, and argues that its experience with foreign relations cases has prepared 
it for that role. In so doing, he defends opinions that he has written as a Su-
preme Court Justice (often in concurrence or dissent). However, his argument 
falls flat. Breyer does not successfully show that the Court’s experience with 
foreign relations cases qualifies it to be a knight-errant for the cosmopolitan 
version of liberal legalism that he espouses. 
The key problem is that while the Court does “engage” with the world (as 
Breyer puts it), Breyer gives no reason for thinking that the Court engages with 
the world well. Do the Court’s decisions advance America’s interests or create 
frictions with foreign countries? Do they advance the rule of law in authoritari-
an countries or impose American ideologies on people who disagree with 
them? Justice Breyer does not tell us. Nor is he clear what the Court’s goal 
should be. American interests? Liberal ideals? Something else? 
Part of the problem is that Breyer’s focus is narrow. He discusses a handful 
of Supreme Court decisions, most of them of recent vintage, and a few other 
judicial decisions here and abroad. He provides almost no context for the cases 
 
1. STEPHEN BREYER, THE COURT AND THE WORLD: AMERICAN LAW AND THE NEW GLOBAL RE-
ALITIES 4 (2015). 
2. For a comprehensive treatment of foreign relations law, see CURTIS A. BRADLEY, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. LEGAL SYSTEM (2d ed. 2015). 
a review 
507 
he discusses—the wars in which they arose, the relationships between the 
United States and the countries involved in the cases, the tensions between the 
executive branch and Congress, and the similar political tensions and problems 
in the foreign countries. Aside from a few chapters on national security-related 
cases, he gives little sense of historical change. The book faintly evokes the 
spirit of the mid- to late-1990s—a period of optimism about globalization and 
international cooperation, the advance of democracy after the collapse of com-
munist dictatorships, and the essential reasonableness and cosmopolitanism of 
the “international community.” Law professors who wrote during that optimis-
tic period saw a steady advance in human rights and the international rule of 
law and the decline of “sovereignty,” and put great faith in American judges as 
instruments of progressive, cosmopolitan change.
3
 But Breyer’s discussion is 
too hermetic to supply such an argument. And times have changed. An other-
wise uninformed reader would not know about the crisis of the European Un-
ion; the rise of authoritarianism across the world, including in Hungary, Po-
land, Turkey, Russia, Egypt, Honduras, Thailand, the Philippines, and Rwan-
Rwanda;
4
 the pressure on human rights; the rise and collapse of the Arab 
Spring; or the increasing assertiveness of Russia and China. If the Court can 
handle the world, it may be because the world, in Breyer’s account, is a much 
more peaceful and homogenous place than it really is. 
i .  national security cases 
In the first part of the book, Breyer sketches the history of national security 
cases in the Supreme Court, which he divides into four stages.
5
 During the 
Civil War, the Court refused to interfere with executive actions—this was the 
Ciceronian stage—silent enim leges inter arma. This stage ended before World 
War II. The second stage—“the President wins”—is not much different, but the 
Court at least takes jurisdiction and insists on judicial review before declaring 
the President the victor. This stage extended through World War II. In the 
third stage, the Court finally declares that the President may go too far—
 
3. E.g., LOUIS HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 69-91 
(1990); ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 65-103 (2004); Harold Hongju 
Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599 (1997). For a recent dis-
cussion by a member of this group, see Peter J. Spiro, Sovereigntism’s Twilight, 31 BERKELEY J. 
INT’L L. 307 (2013).
 
4. Arch Puddington & Tyler Roylance, Freedom in the World 2016, FREEDOM HOUSE (2016), 
http://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FH_FITW_Report_2016.pdf [http://perma.cc
/2L5W-R7Z4]. 
5. BREYER, supra note 1, at 12-13. 
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exemplified by the Steel Seizure case
6
 during the Korean War. The fourth stage 
is “no blank check”—and was initiated during the War on Terror after 9/11. 
“Rather than sit on the sidelines and declare that cases of this kind pose an un-
reviewable ‘political question,’ or take jurisdiction but ultimately find for the 
President or Congress as a matter of course, today’s Court will be more en-
gaged when security efforts clash with other constitutional guarantees.”
7
 Breyer 
sees this evolution as a good thing, but cautions that the Court will produce 
good outcomes and contribute to public confidence only if it informs itself 
about the nature of foreign threats.
8
 
Breyer’s account can be compared to those of his late colleague, Chief Jus-
tice William Rehnquist, and of Professor Geoffrey Stone, both of whom wrote 
books on this topic.
9
 Rehnquist argues that the Court’s tradition of deference to 
the executive branch in time of war resulted from the Court’s recognition of the 
executive branch’s superior expertise over military matters as well as numerous 
practicalities, including the executive’s control over the military, the need for 
speed and secrecy during wartime, and the central role of the President in 
maintaining public morale. For Rehnquist, a measure of deference was neces-
sary even if it allowed injustices to occur.
10
 Stone argues that the Court was 
wrong in most cases to adopt a deferential attitude toward aggressive national 
security actions by the executive branch. In virtually every case, he argues, the 
basis for the action turned out to be false or exaggerated.
11
 For this reason, 
Stone urges the Court to scrutinize executive actions during war and other 
emergencies. 
Neither Rehnquist nor Stone argued that the Court had become less defer-
ential over time—though they wrote before or only at the start of the Guan-
tanamo cases (Rehnquist in 1998, Stone in 2004). Breyer, by contrast, presents 
a Whig history, one in which the Court has shown itself increasingly willing to 
scrutinize actions of the executive, which he attributes to greater rights con-
sciousness after World War II,
12
 increasing public reliance on judicial protec-
 
6. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
7. BREYER, supra note 1, at 80. 
8. Id. at 87. 
9. There is, of course, a huge literature on this topic. For a useful recent contribution that takes 
a quantitative approach and discusses the literature, see Lee Epstein et al., The Supreme Court 
During Crisis: How War Affects Only Non-War Cases, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2005). 
10. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME 222 (1998). 
11. GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 
1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 528 (2004). 
12. BREYER, supra note 1, at 66. 
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tion of rights beginning with Brown v. Board of Education,
13
 and increasing 
global interdependence, as a result of which foreign threats are routine rather 
than anomalous.
14
 
It takes some manipulation of historical materials to construct this neat sto-
ry of progress, however. Breyer disregards cases that conflict with it. For exam-
ple, as early as 1804, the Supreme Court countermanded a military order of the 
executive on the grounds that it misinterpreted an act of Congress.
15
 During 
the Civil War, Justice Taney declared Merryman’s detention unlawful; the U.S. 
government ignored his decision, but Taney tried.
16
 In the 1866 case of Ex parte 
Milligan, the Court rejected the government’s wartime use of military tribunals 
in areas in which civilian courts were open.
17
 Breyer notes that Milligan was de-
cided after the war was over and argues that it thus does not count against his 
thesis that in Stage One the Ciceronian view prevailed.
18
 But 1866 was a period 
of military occupation in the South, and Breyer cites Curtiss-Wright, another 
non-wartime case, for his thesis that “the President wins” in Stage Two,
19
 while 
disregarding a case that is in tension with his thesis—Ex parte Endo, where the 
Court granted the writ of habeas corpus filed by an internee during World War 
II.
20
 
Stage Three is exhausted by the Korean War-era Steel Seizure case, in which 
the President’s attempt to seize steel mills in order to ensure that a strike would 
not interfere with the production of steel for military armaments was blocked 
by the Court.
21
 Breyer rightly sees the Steel Seizure opinion as a repudiation of 
emergency power, but then what to make of Stage Four—the Guantanamo cas-
es of Rasul v. Bush,
22
 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,
23
 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,
24
 and 
Boumediene v. Bush?
25
 While Breyer presents these cases as the apex of judicial 
 
13. Id. at 65. 
14. Id. at 81. 
15. Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. 170, 179 (1804); see also Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. 110, 125-26 
(1814) (also constraining the executive’s wartime power). 
16. Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 148 (1861). 
17. 71 U.S. 2, 10 (1866). 
18. BREYER, supra note 1, at 79. 
19. Id. at 25-31; see United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). 
20. Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 297 (1944). 
21. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
22. 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
23. 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
24. 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
25. 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
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scrutiny of emergency action by the executive, they are more ambiguous than 
he lets on. For one thing, it is not clear whether the cases should be considered 
wartime cases. The “War on Terror” was an ambiguous quasi-war rather than a 
classic interstate war like the Korean War and World War II. This alone may 
explain why the Court was less deferential than it might have been otherwise. 
More important, the Court acted with extreme sluggishness—Boumediene, the 
most important of the quartet, was decided seven years into the War on Terror, 
almost as long as the American involvement in World War I, World War II, 
and the Korean War combined. Moreover, the Court yielded to the government 
on major issues—above all, on the power to detain indefinitely, with limited 
procedural protections. It did not order the government to release a single de-
tainee, instead leaving further development of the law to the lower courts, and 
then refused to grant writs of certiorari requested by detainees unhappy with 
the lower court rulings.
26
 And it remains unclear whether the government has 
released detainees because of judicial orders or for military and political rea-
sons.
27
 By contrast, the steel mills were returned to their owners; the Pentagon 
papers were published.
28
 
The problem here is methodological. There is no easy way to measure the 
variable of interest—the extent to which the Supreme Court defers to executive 
action. Counting up wins and losses for the government does not work because 
the legal aggressiveness of the government’s actions varies. So the Whig history 
fails, and with it, the largely implicit but unmistakable argument that the Court 
has learned from its mistakes that engagement with the executive is to be pre-
ferred to passivity. An alternative view is that the Court has repeatedly blun-
dered—overestimating foreign threats and credulously relying on the exaggera-
tions of the executive branch (as Stone argues). Or that it has wisely deferred 
to the executive branch in most cases (as Rehnquist argues). Both of these nar-
 
26. See, e.g., Kiyemba v. Obama, 561 F.3d 509 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (denying the release of Uighurs 
held at Guantanamo Bay), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 1005 (2010). 
27. See Aziz Z. Huq, What Good Is Habeas?, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 385, 409 (2010) (noting that 
the United States government claims that “detainees are in effect seeking collateral review of 
the primary sorting mechanism for making military detention decisions, which is internal to 
the military” and that about one-third of successful habeas petitions do not result in re-
lease); see also Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Obama’s AUMF Legacy 14-15 (Aug. 
24, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=2823701 [http://perma.cc/L6PW-E54A] (describing various D.C. Circuit decisions from 
2010 to 2013, in which numerous panels found that the demarcation of the end of hostili-
ties—and correspondingly, the end of the executive’s relatively unconstrained detention au-
thority—was a nonjusticiable political question). 
28. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
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ratives are equally consistent with the case law. The doctrinal history supplied 
by Breyer is unable to distinguish between these competing explanations. 
For this reason, this section of the book also does not advance Breyer’s 
overall thesis that the Court is capable of engaging with the world. Indeed, he 
does not tell us in so many words how the national security cases might sup-
port such an argument, but implicitly at least, the argument seems to be that if 
the Court is to protect the civil liberties of Americans and even foreigners 
against executive-branch efforts to protect the United States from foreign 
threats, then it must be able to evaluate those foreign threats and maybe for-
eign public opinion as well. If this is his argument, then he needs to show that 
the Court did take into account these factors and did it properly—but, again, 
he supplies no such evidence. 
i i .  the cross-border reach of statutes 
Breyer’s second topic is the Court’s approach to statutes that apply, or 
might be interpreted to apply, to the activities of Americans or foreigners over-
seas. Breyer argues that because Congress passes such statutes, the Court must 
stand ready to interpret them, and in order to interpret them, the Court must 
inform itself of foreign practices and foreign legal systems. He considers four 
cases. In F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., the Court held that for-
eign buyers of vitamins from a worldwide cartel consisting of companies locat-
ed largely but not entirely outside the United States could not sue the cartel 
members under U.S. antitrust law.
29
 In Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, 
Inc., the Court held that a statute authorized district courts to order discovery 
of documents for use in foreign proceedings even if the relevant foreign tribu-
nal objected.
30
 In Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., the Court held that 
American securities fraud law did not create a cause of action for Australian 
purchasers of the stock of an Australian corporation, whose stock was listed on 
the Australian stock exchange, where the corporation had allegedly committed 
fraud in connection with its purchase of an American business.
31
 And in 
Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., the Court held that a Thai national who re-
sided in the United States did not violate U.S. copyright law by asking family 
and friends in Thailand to buy the inexpensive foreign edition of some U.S. 
books, which he resold in the United States at a profit.
32
 
 
29. 542 U.S. 155, 175 (2004). 
30. 542 U.S. 241, 246 (2004). 
31. 561 U.S. 247, 265 (2010). 
32. 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1358 (2013). 
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The cases all involve statutes that were written in broad terms that made it 
possible to read them as applying overseas. The statute in Intel explicitly re-
ferred to foreign tribunals.
33
 But the vagueness of the statutes suggested that 
Congress had not always given careful consideration to whether they should be 
applied overseas, and, if so, how the overseas application of the statute should 
take account of the unique characteristics of a cross-border transaction and the 
attitudes of foreign governments. This problem—the problem of extraterritori-
al application of statutes—has existed since the Founding. To address it, the 
courts developed a presumption against extraterritoriality, reflecting the as-
sumption that Congress normally seeks to regulate domestic matters only, and 
that application of statutes overseas creates friction with other countries that 
should be minimized.
34
 However, as these cases illustrate, courts have fre-
quently found that presumption to be rebutted. 
Breyer argues that in all of these cases, the Court was required to struggle 
with the foreign implications of American laws. He draws three lessons from 
this: (1) that American interests are entwined with the interests and activities 
of foreign countries; (2) that the Court must understand these connections in 
order to resolve cases appropriately; and (3) that the Court can depend on the 
executive branch, foreign governments, and other interested parties to supply it 
with the information it needs. Maybe Breyer is right that all these cases show 
that the Court can engage with the world in a productive fashion. But his next 
illustration suggests some grounds for doubt. 
The Alien Tort Statute (ATS), originally enacted in 1789, provides: “The 
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a 
tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United 
States.”
35
 Because the statute was hardly ever used or even mentioned during 
the first 190 years of its existence, no one knows what Congress intended. The 
best guess is that Congress sought to give foreign officials and other citizens 
access to federal courts if they were victims of torts on American soil, as state 
courts were thought to be unreliable forums when foreign relations were at 
stake.
36
 At the time, a mob attack on a foreign dignitary could be an act of war 
if he were not given a remedy in court. The statute was probably a jurisdiction-
 
33. Intel, 542 U.S. at 241; see 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (2012) (“The district court of the district in which 
a person resides . . . may order him to give his testimony . . . for use in a proceeding in a for-
eign or international tribunal . . . .”). 
34. See, e.g., United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610 (1818) (discussing the political na-
ture of overseas applications of piracy statutes). 
35. Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012). 
36. BRADLEY, supra note 2, at 202-04. 
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granting statute that did not create substantive rights but instead allowed in-
ternational law to be enforced to a limited extent. 
In 1980, the Second Circuit released an opinion in a case called Filartiga v. 
Pena-Irala, in which the family of a man tortured to death by a police officer in 
Paraguay sued that officer in federal court.
37
 The court held that the family had 
a cause of action under the ATS because torture was a violation of the law of 
nations.
38
 The plaintiffs eventually won a large award against the defendant, 
who, however, fled back to Paraguay, and in any event did not have the funds 
to pay. The Second Circuit decision opened the floodgates to ATS litigation. 
Public interest groups concerned about human rights took aim at former and 
current dictators and other major malefactors. Suits were brought against the 
estate of former Philippine leader Ferdinand Marcos,
39
 against former Bosnian 
leader Radovan Karadžić,40 and against Kelbessa Negewo, a former Ethiopian 
government official.
41
 Private lawyers realized that they could bring suits 
against multinational corporations that were complicit in human rights viola-
tions of foreign governments. Lawsuits were brought against Unocal,
42
 
Chiquita,
43
 and corporations that did business with the apartheid government 
in South Africa,
44
 among many others. While foreign governments and acting 
heads of state were protected by sovereign immunity, virtually everyone else 
was fair game. 
The Supreme Court has heard two ATS cases: Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain and 
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum.
45
 In Sosa, the plaintiff was a Mexican doctor 
who had been kidnapped by American drug agents from Mexico and brought 
to the United States for trial.
46
 The Americans believed that he had assisted in 
the torture-murder of another agent, although he was ultimately acquitted. So-
sa then turned around and sued the Americans under the ATS, arguing that the 
kidnapping violated international law. The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s 
 
37. 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980). 
38. Id. at 887. 
39. Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994). 
40. Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995). 
41. Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844 (11th Cir. 1996). 
42. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002). 
43. In re Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc. Alien Tort Statute & S’holder Derivative Litig., 792 F. Supp. 
2d 1301 (S.D. Fla. 2011). 
44. In re S. Afr. Apartheid Litig., 15 F. Supp. 3d 454 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
45. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 
(2004). 
46. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 692. 
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ruling in his favor, holding that an “illegal detention of less than a day” did not 
violate “a norm of international character accepted by the civilized world and 
defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century para-
digms we have recognized,” or, in other words, a norm that is “specific, univer-
sal, and obligatory.”
47
 The Court was worried that plaintiffs could characterize 
nearly any abusive or illegal act as a violation of international law. If they could, 
then U.S. courts would be flooded with lawsuits by aliens against foreign and 
U.S. officials, including in circumstances where the aliens would not normally 
be afforded a remedy. And “[s]ince many attempts by federal courts to craft 
remedies for the violation of new norms of international law would raise risks 
of adverse foreign policy consequences, they should be undertaken, if at all, 
with great caution.”
48
 
In the second case, Kiobel, the plaintiffs were Nigerian citizens who argued 
that the defendant oil companies aided the Nigerian government’s violent sup-
pression of protests against oil extraction in the Niger delta.
49
 The Second Cir-
cuit ruled for the defendants on the ground that the law of nations did not cre-
ate liability for corporations. The Supreme Court affirmed, but on a different 
ground—that the ATS does not apply extraterritorially. While the bulk of the 
majority opinion is a textualist evaluation of the statute and its sources, Chief 
Justice Roberts makes several policy arguments of relevance here. He empha-
sizes “the danger of unwarranted judicial interference in the conduct of foreign 
policy,” which would arise from extraterritorial application of the ATS.
50
 He al-
so says: 
[T]here is no indication that the ATS was passed to make the United 
States a uniquely hospitable forum for the enforcement of international 
norms. As Justice Story put it, “No nation has ever yet pretended to be 
the custos morum of the whole world . . . .” It is implausible to suppose 
that the First Congress wanted their fledgling Republic—struggling to 
receive international recognition—to be the first. Indeed, the parties 
offer no evidence that any nation, meek or mighty, presumed to do such 
a thing.
51
 
The lesson of Sosa and Kiobel was clear. The Court feared that an expansive 
interpretation of the ATS would involve the federal courts in foreign controver-
 
47. Id. at 738, 725, 732. 
48. Id. at 727-28. 
49. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1662. 
50. Id. at 1664. 
51. Id. at 1668 (citation omitted). 
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sies that they did not understand, and without a specific mandate from Con-
gress.
52
 In doing so, the majority rejected Breyer’s optimism that the Court can 
take on the world. 
Breyer tries to interpret Sosa and Kiobel so as not to completely shut the 
door to victims of foreign abuses like the plaintiffs in Filartiga.
53
 He sees the 
statute as an important way for America to help foreign victims of human 
rights abuses. But his defense of the ATS is muted. He does not go as far as ac-
ademic defenders of the ATS,
54
 who have sought the most generous interpreta-
tions of the ATS, ones that would have precisely the effect of converting the 
U.S. judiciary into the custos morum of the world. Why not? While Breyer sup-
plies more questions than answers, a hint can be found in his concerns about 
international comity. “Can we interpret our statutes so that (if our lead were 
followed by [foreign] courts) it would keep nations from stepping on one an-
other’s toes?”
55
 He is not sure. Breyer reassures himself that the ATS mirrors 
foreign practices. As he says in his concurrence in Kiobel: 
Other countries permit some form of lawsuit brought by a foreign na-
tional against a foreign national, based upon conduct taking place 
abroad and seeking damages. Certain countries, which find “universal” 
criminal “jurisdiction” to try perpetrators of particularly heinous crimes 
such as piracy and genocide, see Restatement § 404, also permit pri-
vate persons injured by that conduct to pursue “actions civiles,” seeking 
civil damages in the criminal proceeding . . . . Moreover, the United 
Kingdom and the Netherlands, while not authorizing such damages ac-
 
52. Although the Court clearly sought to cut back on ATS cases in Sosa, the number of cases in 
federal district courts rose in its wake. According to a Westlaw search, district courts issued 
twenty-seven opinions citing the ATS in 2003 and twenty in 2004, the year Sosa was decid-
ed. This number increased to forty-one in 2005 and sixty in 2010. The reason is probably 
that Sosa was the first Supreme Court case that explicitly acknowledged the basic approach 
to ATS litigation in Filartiga, rejecting a stricter position that would have eliminated the val-
ue of the statute for plaintiffs. The number of opinions fell from fifty-nine in 2013—the year 
Kiobel was decided—to thirty-eight in 2014 and thirty-five in 2015. (The search term was “28 
U.S.C. § 1350.”) 
53. As Curtis Bradley notes, Breyer tries to argue that the holding of the majority opinion is the 
position that he took in his concurrence. See Curtis Bradley, Book Review, 110 AM. J. INT’L L. 
130, 135 (2016) (reviewing STEPHEN BREYER, THE COURT AND THE WORLD: AMERICAN LAW 
AND THE NEW GLOBAL REALITIES (2015)) (“What Justice Breyer now maintains is entailed by 
the majority opinion is what he seemed to suggest in his concurrence in Kiobel was not the 
majority’s position.”). 
54. See, e.g., Koh, supra note 3. 
55. BREYER, supra note 1, at 163.  
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tions themselves, tell us that they would have no objection to the exer-
cise of American jurisdiction in cases such as Filartiga and Marcos.
56
 
And yet foreign governments have objected vociferously to other ATS cas-
es—above all, the apartheid litigation. The Netherlands and Britain submitted 
an amicus brief in Kiobel objecting to ATS jurisdiction, as did the United States. 
Both briefs argued that ATS litigation in this instance would violate the princi-
ples of international law and comity.
57
 And as Breyer seems to be aware, there 
is nothing like the ATS in any other country.
58
 The universal jurisdiction stat-
utes to which Breyer refers authorize criminal enforcement, to be brought by 
government authorities attentive to the implications of such actions for foreign 
relations, with weak and ambiguous restitution rights for victims. Moreover, 
not mentioned by Breyer, these statutes are rarely used by foreign govern-
ments, and in recent years have been weakened
59
—often under pressure from 
the U.S. government, which frets about their possible application to American 
officials.
 
The story of the ATS retrospectively throws a shadow on Breyer’s sunny 
discussion of overseas application of the antitrust and securities laws. Foreign 
governments deeply resent all of these extensions of American power; the only 
difference is that they have made much more noise about the ATS in litigation. 
With his nose firmly buried in the briefs, Breyer gives more credence to the 
opposition to the ATS, but still tries to dismiss it. But the bottom line for even 
a Justice with cosmopolitan instincts is whether the Court can really under-
stand why foreign governments and populations do not want American laws 
applied to them even when we Americans are convinced that they advance the 
rule of law around the world. It seems to me that the majorities in Sosa and Ki-
obel take this worry more seriously than Breyer does.
60
 
 
56. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1676 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
57. Brief of the Governments of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 6, Kiobel, 
133 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 10-1491). 
58. See BRADLEY, supra note 2, at 230. 
59. See Ernest A. Young, Universal Jurisdiction, the Alien Tort Statute, and Transnational Public-
Law Litigation After Kiobel, 64 DUKE L.J. 1023, 1028-43 (2015). 
60. In RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community, No. 15-138, slip op. at 1 (U.S. June 20, 2016), 
the Court was confronted with this tradeoff once again. One question in that case was 
whether the private right of action in the civil RICO statute applied extraterritorially. Id. at 
18. European countries, which had brought a RICO claim against an American company, ar-
gued that it did. Id. The majority rejected this view, in part on the ground that extraterritori-
al application would create “friction” with foreign countries. Id. at 21. Justice Breyer disa-
greed. Id., slip op. at 1 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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i i i . treaties 
Breyer argues that another reason that the Supreme Court cannot avoid ad-
dressing “foreign law” is that it must interpret treaties. As before, the problem 
is that Breyer is right only in the unimportant sense that the Court must decide 
cases that come before it, while ignoring serious questions about whether the 
Court does its job well. Breyer discusses six cases. Let us focus first on Abbott v. 
Abbott, where the Court was required to interpret the Hague Convention on the 
Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.
61
 A married couple, the Ab-
botts, moved to Chile and subsequently separated. Mrs. Abbott was awarded 
custody of their child, while Mr. Abbott was awarded visitation rights. Fearing 
that Mr. Abbott was planning to illegally move the child to Britain, Mrs. Ab-
bott preemptively moved with the child to Texas, where Mr. Abbott found 
them and sued in federal district court to obtain an order that the child be re-
turned to Chile. The Convention bans the removal of a child from a country if 
(among other things) the removal “is in breach of rights of custody.”
62
 The 
question was whether Mr. Abbott’s visitation rights in Chile should be inter-
preted as a “right of custody.” If so, then the treaty prohibited Mrs. Abbot’s ac-
tions. Employing the standard tools of interpretation, the Court held that Mr. 
Abbott’s visitation rights counted as custody under the terms of the treaty be-
cause his rights authorized him under Chilean law to block the child from be-
ing removed from Chile.
63
 
What is the purpose of discussing this run-of-the-mill treaty interpretation 
case? “What is novel,” says Breyer, “is that the traditional approach [of treaty 
interpretation] required the Court to understand not only an international 
document—namely, a treaty—but a foreign country’s laws and customs in an 
area most unfamiliar to federal courts, domestic relations . . . .”
64
 But this prac-
tice is not actually novel. Many treaties of old vintage require the Court to in-
terpret foreign law. Every extradition request requires a court to interpret for-
eign criminal law because extradition treaties require that the illegal act in 
question be a crime under the law of both countries. Courts also interpret for-
eign law in run-of-the-mill tort and contract cases, in which relevant events 
take place in foreign jurisdictions, as well as enforcement-of-judgment cases, in 
which courts are asked to enforce a judgment issued by a court in a foreign ju-
risdiction. 
 
61. 560 U.S. 1 (2010). 
62. Id. at 8. 
63. Id. at 10. 
64. BREYER, supra note 1, at 175. 
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Two much more important cases address the relationship between the In-
ternational Court of Justice (ICJ) and the federal judiciary. The ICJ is an inter-
national court of general jurisdiction; the United States has agreed to be bound 
by its rulings under certain conditions. A pair of cases in the ICJ established 
that the United States violated a treaty called the Vienna Convention on Con-
sular Relations by failing to inform foreign nationals arrested for criminal ac-
tivity on U.S. soil of their right to obtain advice from their nation’s consulate.
65
 
The United States argued that the defendants in question had, under the pro-
cedural default rule, forfeited their Vienna Convention claims by failing to raise 
them at trial. But the ICJ also held that the procedural default rule violated in-
ternational law to the extent that it prevented the defendants from asserting 
their treaty rights when they finally learned of them. 
In Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, a defendant who was not informed of his right 
to consular advice under the Vienna Convention argued that he was entitled to 
relief. The Court held that while the ICJ’s interpretation of international law 
was entitled “to respectful consideration,” the ICJ was wrong in its holding that 
the procedural default rule violated the Vienna Convention.
66
 In Medellín v. 
Texas, where the defendant argued that the prior ICJ holding
67
 in his favor 
bound the United States, the Court went further and held that the relevant in-
ternational law was not self-executing and therefore not binding on the 
courts.
68
 These two cases, unlike the Hague Convention cases, were actually 
important; they demonstrated a rejection by the majority of the sensitivity to 
international law that Breyer advocates. Accordingly, he wrote dissents in both 
cases. 
In the conclusion of this portion of the book, Breyer points out that with 
the growth of standard-setting and regulation by international bodies, the 
Court will increasingly face a tradeoff. If it holds that the rules issued by these 
bodies are automatically incorporated into domestic law, then Americans may 
be deprived of constitutional procedural guarantees and democratic control 
over the rules that bind them. But if it instead holds that the international rules 
are subject to domestic procedural rights and democratic controls, then the 
Court may interfere with international cooperation. This tradeoff has been 
much discussed in the academic literature, with no consensus as to how it 
 
65. La Grand (Ger. v U.S.), Judgment, 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27); Avena & Other Mexican Na-
tionals (Mex. v. U.S.), Judgment, 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31). 
66. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 353 (2006) (citing Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 
375 (1998)). 
67. Avena, 2004 I.C.J. 12. 
68. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008). 
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should be made.
69
 The Court in Sanchez-Llamas and Medellin decisively opted 
for constitutional protections. Breyer declines to do much more than identify 
the tradeoff and repeat his mantra that the “courts and the legal profes-
sion . . . [must] understand both the legal and practical realities elsewhere in 
the world if we are to preserve our basic American values.”
70
 But it is just not 
clear what practical implications follow from this observation. 
The upshot is that the reader is left wondering how to evaluate the Court’s 
decisions. Because of Breyer’s hermetic approach, we are given no information 
as to whether the Court’s refusal to follow the ICJ has harmed America’s inter-
ests by damaging its reputation or creating frictions with foreign countries. 
Nor do we know whether these decisions damaged the ICJ’s reputation in a 
way that has caused harm to other countries. However, I do agree with Breyer 
that the Court needs to know something about the world if it is to interpret 
treaties. 
iv. the “foreign law” controversy 
In a brief chapter, Breyer wades into the controversy over using “foreign 
law” to interpret the Constitution. This debate excited scholars, journalists, 
and even politicians some years ago but has since died down. 
At its core, the debate concerned whether the Court should interpret am-
biguous clauses of the Constitution in light of various foreign and international 
materials, including judicial opinions and statutes in foreign countries, interna-
tional law, and decisions of international tribunals. One aspect of the debate 
centered on the meaning of “cruel and unusual punishment” in the Eighth 
Amendment. The Court has held that this phrase should be interpreted in light 
of evolving standards of decency rather than as forbidding only punishments 
regarded as cruel and unusual in 1789.
71
 How does one determine evolving 
standards of decency? A relatively uncontroversial approach was to count the 
number of (American) states that had abolished a type of punishment, and, if 
the number exceeded a threshold, to declare that punishment “cruel and unu-
sual.” In this way, the judgments of state legislatures and state courts gave con-
tent to “cruel and unusual.” But what of the legislatures and courts of foreign 
countries? Should they count as well? 
 
69. See, e.g., The Law and Politics of International Delegation, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 
2008 (Curtis A. Bradley & Judith G. Kelley eds.). 
70. BREYER, supra note 1, at 235. 
71. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958). 
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In several cases, the Court said that they should. In Atkins v. Virginia, the 
Court noted foreign law and world opinion in abolishing capital punishment 
for crimes committed by the mentally retarded.
72
 In Roper v. Simmons, the 
Court held that the juvenile death penalty violates the Eighth Amendment, 
noting that no other country recognized the death penalty for people who 
commit crimes as juveniles.
73
 The Court also cited foreign law in Lawrence v. 
Texas, which abolished the crime of homosexual sodomy.
74
 Occasional citations 
to foreign law can be found in a handful of other opinions in the Court’s histo-
ry. These opinions do not, however, tell us the extent to which foreign law mo-
tivated or influenced the Court’s ultimate decision. 
The leading critic of foreign law has been Justice Scalia. For Justice Scalia, 
the decisive objection was that foreign law played no role in originalism, his 
brand of constitutional interpretation. Justice Scalia and others have also ar-
gued that the Court is not competent to evaluate foreign law, which often re-
flects legal peculiarities and cultural differences in foreign countries. He has ar-
gued that citation to foreign law is an opportunistic cover for ideological 
decision making, and that, if foreign law were really to play a role in constitu-
tional interpretation, democracy and American sovereignty would suffer as a 
consequence.
75
 
Breyer argues, reasonably, that the Court must create rules—this is true 
even if originalism were accepted—and that it may be advantageous to consider 
what works and does not work in other countries.
76
 This is not much different 
from what state common law courts do when they look at the law in other 
(American) states. Breyer also claims that citation to foreign law has diplomatic 
value. When the Supreme Court cites a foreign opinion, it gives moral support 
to judges who seek to advance rule-of-law values in foreign countries where the 
 
72. 536 U.S. 304, 315 n.21 (2002). 
73. 543 U.S. 551, 575-78 (2005); see also Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 80-82 (2010) (holding 
that juveniles may not be sentenced to life in prison without parole for a crime other than 
homicide). 
74. 539 U.S. 558, 572-73, 576-77 (2003). 
75. Justice Scalia’s views can be found in his debate with Justice Breyer at American  
University. Constitutional Relevance of Foreign Court Decisions, C-SPAN (Jan.  
13, 2005), http://www.c-span.org/video/?185122-1/constitutional-relevance-foreign-court 
-decisions [http://perma.cc/7EQR-F2WU]. 
76. Numerous academics have supported this argument. For a philosophical version, see JERE-
MY WALDRON, “PARTLY LAWS COMMON TO ALL MANKIND”: FOREIGN LAW IN AMERICAN 
COURTS (2012). For a social science approach, see Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, The 
Law of Other States, 59 STAN. L. REV. 131 (2006). For a summary of the debate and other cita-
tions to the literature, see BRADLEY, supra note 2, at 161-64. 
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ruling elite is hostile to them.
77
 This seems considerably less plausible than 
Breyer’s first argument, and he gives no evidence for this claim. In any event 
the explosive political reaction
78
 seems to have put a damper on the Court’s en-
thusiasm for citing foreign law, with foreign law references apparently being 
limited to Eighth Amendment cases for the time being, despite the much more 
general application indicated by Breyer’s arguments. 
Breyer’s major argument in this section is that the Court addresses foreign 
legal materials all the time. This may be the central point of his book, though 
he does not make this point until page 244. His argument is worth quoting at 
length: 
My hope is that the cases I’ve now discussed suggest that the critics’ 
concerns about judicial references to foreign law are beside the point. 
Their fears don’t much resonate when one understands the way in 
which foreign law and practices are actually considered . . . . It is not the 
cosmopolitanism of some jurists that seeks this kind of engagement but 
the nature of the world itself that demands it. 
 . . . As we have seen, a great many recent cases—whether involving 
treaties, the foreign reach of American statutes, or questions of U.S. ju-
risdiction over activity taking place abroad—made it unavoidable that 
the Court analyze foreign or international legal rules, statutes, or prac-
tices to arrive at a reasoned decision. In such cases, doing so was not 
simply helpful but essential. At the same time, I find little evidence that 
it has led to any result not entirely consistent with American laws and 
practice.
79
 
Breyer believes that reliance on foreign law is not a choice; it is “unavoida-
ble” and “essential.” It is the “nature of the world” that requires this practice ra-
 
77. Justice Breyer makes this argument in his debate with Justice Scalia at American University: 
Look, let me be a little bit more frank, that in some of these countries there are in-
stitutions, courts that are trying to make their way in societies that didn’t used to 
be democratic, and they are trying to protect human rights, they are trying to pro-
tect democracy. They have a document called a constitution, and they want to be 
independent judges. And for years people all over the world have cited the Su-
preme Court, why don’t we cite them occasionally? They will then go to some of 
their legislators and others and say, “See, the Supreme Court of the United States 
cites us.” That might give them a leg up, even if we just say it’s an interesting ex-
ample. So, you see, it shows we read their opinions. That’s important. 
  Constitutional Relevance of Foreign Court Decisions, supra note 75, at 28:48-29:30. 
78. See BRADLEY, supra note 2, at 164 & nn.128-31. 
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ther than the Justices’ cosmopolitan inclinations. One might think that this ar-
gument should be a sufficient refutation of the critics because if reliance on for-
eign law is “unavoidable,” then why bother squabbling over justification? 
But Breyer is confusing two different views. Justice Scalia and the other 
critics of foreign law objected to its use to interpret (or modify) the U.S. Con-
stitution. They did not object to treaty or statutory interpretation that required 
the Court to account for foreign law. Breyer’s arguments, based as they are on 
examples of treaty and statutory interpretation, do not support his conclusion. 
Instead, reliance on foreign law for the purpose of interpreting (or modifying) 
the Constitution is a choice. The debate is whether it is a wise choice or not. In 
Obergefell v. Hodges,
80
 in which the Court found a right to same-sex marriage, 
the majority (which Breyer joined) chose not to rely on foreign law, even 
though there was plenty that could have been cited.
81
 
Why did the Court eschew foreign law in this instance? It may be because 
same-sex marriage has been rejected by the vast majority of countries, many of 
which reject gay rights altogether and instead criminalize homosexual activity. 
One amicus brief tried to evade these obstacles through a twofold maneuver.
82
 
First, it argued that, when determining world opinion, the Court should disre-
gard countries that do not share “our constitutional values.”
83
 Once one elimi-
nates countries that do not share our values, the ratio of countries that recog-
nize same-sex marriage to those that do not may not look so bad.
84
 However, 
the amicus brief fails to tell us which countries do and do not share our val-
 
80. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
81. Compare Brief for Foreign and Comparative Law Experts Harold Hongju Koh et al. as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 4, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 
14-574) [hereinafter Brief for Foreign and Comparative Law Experts] (“Since 2001, twenty 
countries have embraced equal marriage throughout their jurisdictions for reasons that have 
persuasive force before this Court.”), with Brief for 54 International and Comparative Law 
Experts from 27 Countries and the Marriage and Family Law Research Project as Amici Cu-
riae in Support of the Respondent at 3, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-
571, 14-574) (“[A]ny form of same-sex marriage has only been adopted by 17 of the 193 
member states of the United Nations.”). 
82. Brief for Foreign and Comparative Law Experts, supra note 81, at 12. 
83. Id. 
84. The remaining countries are mostly countries populated by white Europeans, recalling a line 
in Reynolds v. United States: “Polygamy has always been odious among the northern and 
western nations of Europe, and, until the establishment of the Mormon Church, was almost 
exclusively a feature of the life of Asiatic and of African people.” 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879), 
quoted in Jeremy Waldron, Foreign Law and the Modern Ius Gentium, 119 HARV. L. REV. 129, 
145 n.71 (2005). 
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ues.
85
 For example, suppose we eliminate all countries designated “not free” or 
“partly free” by Freedom House. The ratio is still not promising—about seven-
teen out of eighty-six.
86
 Second, the brief argues that the Court must look for a 
“progression.”
87
 Even though most countries that share “our constitutional val-
ues” reject same-sex marriage, fewer such countries do so today compared to in 
the past. It is not hard to see why even a cosmopolitan-minded majority would 
decline this attempt to manipulate world opinion to fit its holding. But then 
what is left of Breyer’s argument that reliance on foreign law is not only wise 
but “unavoidable”? 
In the passage quoted above, Breyer also argues that the Court has been 
prepared to use foreign law in constitutional interpretation through its in-
volvement in treaty cases and cases involving extraterritorial statutory interpre-
tation. Unlike the prior argument, this argument is not about necessity, but 
about the capacity of the Court to interpret foreign materials correctly. Howev-
er, as I noted before, those chapters do not actually show that the Court inter-
preted foreign legal materials well—only that the Court interpreted them. Brey-
er’s own cautious phrasing, with its double negative—“little evidence” that the 
Court’s reliance on foreign law is “not entirely consistent” with American law—
perhaps betrays awareness of this problem with his claim.
88
 
 
conclusion 
Each of Breyer’s arguments boils down to the claim that, because the Su-
preme Court is unavoidably engaged in international relations, it should em-
brace this role enthusiastically rather than reluctantly. But each of his argu-
ments advances this claim haltingly or not at all. The national security cases 
prove, he says, that the Court must understand foreign threats. But in the cases 
he cites, he fails to show that the Court helped foreign relations by imposing 
some modest limits on the U.S. government’s military and counterterrorism 
operations. The extraterritorial statute cases and the treaty cases only show the 
ambiguity that the Court faces, as it is unclear whether the Court’s decisions 
have advanced international relations or created international frictions. It re-
mains obscure whether the Court does any good for international relations, or 
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for the rights of Americans, when it uses foreign and international law to inter-
pret the U.S. Constitution. Breyer tries to evade these problems by defining 
(mostly implicitly) the Court’s foreign relations mission as one in which it tries 
to advance liberal values. However, whether the United States actually should 
advance liberal values abroad, and if so, how it should conduct this mission, are 
hotly contested political questions both in this country and abroad. 
The major impression the book leaves the reader is the weakness of the Su-
preme Court in the face of foreign challenges. The Court is hobbled by its lim-
ited institutional role as a judicial body of last resort, one that is only intermit-
tently engaged with foreign relations issues because such engagement must 
emerge in cases and controversies, and only after they wend their way through 
the lower courts. Because the Court works by majority rule, it cannot speak to 
the world with a strong, consistent voice. At a time when democracy and hu-
man rights are in retreat, when the foreign judges with whom Breyer hobnobs 
are brushed aside like gnats by authoritarian governments, the Court’s capacity 
to assist those judges in the “sustained struggle against arbitrariness” seems 
puny.
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